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Abstract 
Fully cooperative multiagent systems-those in 
which agents share a joint utility model-is of 
special interest in AI. A key problem is that of en­
suring that the actions of individual agents are co­
ordinated, especially in settings where the agents 
are autonomous decision makers. We investigate 
approaches to learning coordinated strategies in 
stochastic domains where an agent's actions are 
not directly observable by others. Much recent 
work in game theory has adopted a Bayesian 
learning perspective to the more general problem 
of equilibrium selection, but tends to assume that 
actions can be observed. We discuss the special 
problems that arise when actions are not observ­
able, including effects on rates of convergence, 
and the effect of action failure probabilities and 
asymmetries. We also use likelihood estimates 
as a means of generalizing fictitious play learn­
ing models in our setting. Finally, we propose the 
use of maximum likelihood as a means of remov­
ing strategies from consideration, with the aim 
of convergence to a conventional equilibrium, at 
which point learning and deliberation can cease. 
1 Introduction 
The design of systems of multiple autonomous agents that 
interact in various ways (pursuing their own ends or com­
patible goals) has attracted a great deal of attention in AI. Of 
special interest are systems in which individual agents share 
the same goals or utility function-in such fully cooperative 
settings, the agents collectively act toward common desired 
ends. While more general problems involving the interac­
tion of potentially self-interested agents have received the 
bulk of attention in distributed AI, fully cooperative prob­
lems naturally arise in task distribution. For example, a user 
might assign some number of autonomous mobile robots, or 
perhaps software agents, to some task, all of which should 
share the same utility function (namely, that of the user). 
For certain purposes, it may make sense to model a busi­
ness or organization in a similar way. 
A key difficulty in cooperative multiagent systems is that 
of ensuring that the actions of individual agents are coor­
dinated so that the shared goals are achieved efficiently. 
This is especially important in settings where the agents 
are autonomous decision makers (and preprogrammed co­
ordinated strategies are not available), as in the situations 
mentioned above. One natural way to view the coordina­
tion problem is as a n-person cooperative game. From the 
perspective of game theory, we are interested in n-person 
games in which the players have a shared or joint utility 
function; that is, any outcome of the game has equal value 
for all players. 
In this paper, we study aspects of the coordination problem 
from the perspective of n-player repeated games. A set of 
agents find themselves in a situation which requires coor­
dinated action (viewed as a single-stage decision problem), 
but can encounter this situation repeatedly.1 Methods such 
as allowing agents to communicate their intentions before­
hand or imposing specific behaviors (e.g., by means of a 
central controller or the use of social laws) may ensure that 
agents behave in a coordinated fashion. However, our in­
terest in this paper is in methods that enable agents to learn 
their component of a coordinated policy through repeated 
experience with the game situation. 
Learning techniques have been well-studied in game theory, 
not only for coordination in cooperative games, but also for 
the more general problem of equilibrium selection [12, 5]. 
Models applied to this problem include fictitious play [13] 
and Bayesian best-response methods [8, 19, 4] (evolution­
ary models have also attracted a great deal of attention [1, 
11]). These have especially nice behavior in coordination 
problems [19]. However, these models tend to assume that 
each agent can observe the exact action performed by all 
others at each interaction. Such action observable scenar-
1 This scenario is appealing in its simplicity, but is not an overly 
realistic picture of multiagent decision problems. However, our 
interest in repeated single-stage games is motivated by a decom­
position of sequential cooperative problems (see below). 
ios will likely be rare in practice, especially when individual 
actions have stochastic effects. Even if states of the system 
(and thus action outcomes) are fully observable-as they 
might be in a Markov decision model-it is unlikely that 
agents will have access to the actual action another agent 
attempted (and hence the "intentions" of the other agent). 
We focus our attention on games where actions are stochas­
tic, and actions are not directly observable. In general, 
agents can observe only the state resulting from the actions 
of the group of players; but they can use this observation 
to assess the probability that other agents performed partic­
ular actions. The introduction of this type of uncertainty 
and partial observability is rather simple to model, but it 
has some rather surprising effects on convergence to coordi­
nated action in the Bayesian best-response model, which we 
examine here. We also adapt fictitious play to this unobserv­
able action setting through the use of likelihood estimates, 
and show that convergence is generally much better than in 
the Bayesian model. 
Finally, we consider the problem of learning conventions 
[9, 16]. One difficulty with stochastic games and models 
that require constant learning is that a run of "bad luck" can 
force agents out of a coordinated equilibrium. More seri­
ous are the computational implications of constantly updat­
ing beliefs and computing a best response for every inter­
action. Following Lewis [9], we take an interest in conven­
tional behavior. Agents should converge to a common un­
derstanding and, once realizing that they have reached a co­
ordinated equilibrium, should never be forced to reconsider 
how to act. Of course, care must be taken to ensure this 
understanding is based on common knowledge, or globally 
accessible information. To this end, we propose the use of 
"
_
globally accessible" likelihood estimates to rule out par­
ticular ways of acting, until only a conventional method of 
acting remains whenever possible. 
We describe the basic framework of coordination games in 
Section 2, as well as their application to multiagent sequen­
tial decision processes (in the form of multiagent Markov 
decision processes). In Section 3 we detail classic mod­
els from game theory for learning coordinated actions, in 
particular fictitious play and Bayesian methods. We also 
point out the difficulty asymmetric coordination games pose 
for such methods. In Section 4, we extend these models 
in rather obvious ways to deal with stochastic, partially­
observable actions. We study a number of properties of 
these models and how convergence is affected by them. We 
address t�e proble�. of convention in Section 5, proposing 
an extensiOn of fictitiOus play dynamics whereby likelihood 
estimates for optimal joint actions are used to rule out pos­
sible courses of action. 
Experimental results are provided to illustrate the perfor­
mance of these methods. We focus (primarily, not exclu­
sively) on 2 x 2 games to keep the exposition clear; but most 
of the conclusions we draw can be applied more broadly. 
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Figure 1: A Two-Agent Coordination Problem 
2 Coordination Games 
2.1 Single Stage Games 
We take as the basic object of study an n-player cooperative 
state game. We assume a collection a of n (heterogeneous) 
agents, each agent i E a having available to it a finite set 
of individual actions A;. The game takes place at a given 
state, at which each agent chooses (independently) an ac­
tion to perform. The chosen actions collectively constitute 
a joint action, the set of which is denoted A= XieaA;. The 
game also has a set of outcomes states S: each joint action 
causes a transition to some outcome state s E S according 
to a fixed distribution. We use Pra ( s) to denote the prob­
ability of outcome s when the joint action a has been exe­
cuted. Finally, we associate a utility U(s) with each s E S. 
I�tuitively, each agent receives reward U (s) if the joint ac­
tiOn adopted by the agents results in s; the game is thus fully 
cooperative, for agents cannot do better by making things 
worse for others. 2 
We note that state games are essentially single-stage exten­
sive form games; but it is convenient to sometimes convert 
them to the corresponding strategic form (or their normal 
representation) [12]. Each joint action a can be associated 
with its expected utility, Lo�;s Pra(s) · U(s), and states 
can be done away with, resultmg in a strategic form game. 
However, the existence of distinct outcome states is crucial 
in the learning models we adopt below. In particular, the 
states provide indirect information about action choices in 
cases where actions are not directly observable. Conversion 
to strategic form precludes the use of this partial informa­
ti�n; however, when actions are perfectly observable, we 
w11I often use strategic form. 
As an example, consider the 2 x 2 game illustrated in Fig­
�re 1, in which two agents, A and B, can move left (l) or 
nght (r) (say, toward a particular goal). The agents are 
rewarded with utility 1 if they both end up in the same 
location-either both left (sl) or both right (s3)-and util­
ity 0 otherwise. The actions available to the agents are 
stochastic, so that if A executes action l, it will end up in 
the left location with probability 0.9 and in the opposite lo-
2 A general n-person state game simply requires that U take 
agents as arguments a� �ell as states to allow for competition; i.e., 
U(s, z) denotes the ut1hty of states to agenti. 
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cation with probability 0.1. This results in the transition 
matrix shown. Should we convert this game to strategic 
form, the Payoff Matrix I describes the expected utility of 
the given joint actions. We will also have occasion to use 
the deterministic version of this game, where each joint ac­
tion has the obvious outcome: Payoff Matrix 2 character­
izes this game. We note that in the deterministic game, an 
agent observing the outcome state is equivalent to observ­
ing its companion's action directly. 
Given such a game, we want the agents to discover an opti­
mal course of action. Unfortunately, the optimal action for 
each agent generally depends on the choices of other agents. 
The typical solution concept adopted in game theory, that of 
a Nash equilibrium, allows us to break out of potential cir­
cularities as follows. 
A randomized strategy for agent i at state game G is a prob­
ability distribution 1r E fl(A;) (where ll(A;) is the set 
of distributions over the agent's action set A;). Intuitively, 
1r(a;) denotes the probability of agent i selecting the indi­
vidual action a' when playing the game. A strategy 1r is de­
terministic if 1r ( a' ) = 1 for some a' E A;. 
A strategy profile for G is a collection II = { 1r; : i E a} 
of strategies for each agent i. The expected value of acting 
according to a fixed profile can easily be determined. We 
note that if each strategy in II is deterministic, we can think 
of II as a joint action, since each agent's action is fixed. A 
reduced profile for agent i is a strategy profile for all agents 
but i (denoted Il_i). Given a profile IL;, a strategy 'IT; is a 
best response for agent i if the expected value of the strategy 
profile II_; U { rr;} is maximal for agent i; that is , agent i 
could not do better using any other strategy 1r;. 
Finally, we say that the strategy profile II is a Nash equi­
librium iff 1r; E II is a best response to IL1, for every 
agent i. In other words, the agents are in equilibrium if 
no agent could expect a better outcome by unilaterally de­
viating from its strategy. In general, the interests of dif­
ferent agents can conflict, making equilibrium determina­
tion quite difficult. However, in fully cooperative games 
each agent expects the same reward and can easily deter­
mine an interesting set of equilibrium profiles as follows. 
We first convert the state game to strategic form (by taking 
expectation of outcome utilities). Any joint action whose 
expected value is maximal is a (deterministic)Nash equilib­
rium. Such an equilibrium is called an optimal joint action 
(OJA). If the agents coordinate their choices so that they se­
lect an OJA, they are behaving as well as possible. 
To illustrate with our example problem (in either the deter­
ministic or nondeterministic version), we see that the OJ As 
are (l, l} and (r, r} . These strategy profiles offer maximal 
expected utility for both agents. We note however that be­
ing in equilibrium does not guarantee the agents are behav­
ing optimally (in a joint sense). The profile in which each 
agent adopts a randomized strategy that selects l and r with 
equal probability is also an equilibrium: given that agent A 
choosesl orr, each with probability 0.5, B has no incentive 
to change its strategy (similarly for A). But this randomized 
equilibrium is suboptimal, for its expected value is half that 
of the optimal equilibria. 
Nash equilibria, unfortunately, do not solve the coordina­
tion problem. W hile the agents can determine the OJAs 
quite readily, the problem remains: how do they decide 
which OJA to adopt? In its most general form, this is pre­
cisely the problem of equilibrium selection studied in game 
theory [12, 5]. We take the coordination problem to be that 
of ensuring agents select individual actions that together 
constitute an optimal or coordinated equilibrium, or OJA.3 
2.2 Multiagent MDPs 
While our focus is on simple repeated state games, our mo­
tivation is not primarily the solution of repeated, single­
stage decision problems. In [2], we propose multiagent 
Markov decision processes (MMDPs) as a framework in 
which to study multiagent cooperative planning (in deci­
sion theoretic contexts). Roughly, MMDPs are Markov de­
cision processes [7, 14, 3] in which actions at each stage are 
comprised of distinct components performed by individual 
agents. The aim there is not to coordinate single state strate­
gies per se, but to construct coordinated policies for ongo­
ing behavior in different states. 
Producing coordinated policies is difficult computationally; 
but one can gain considerable leverage by decomposing 
the problem into distinct state games of the type described 
above, with one game for each state (of a certain type) of 
the MDP. The coordination problem is then reduced to that 
of coordinating locally at each of these state games. In [2] 
we assume that agents can compute the value of coordinated 
(ongoing) policies at individual states.4 These "long term" 
values are used as the outcome utilities in the individual 
state games. If the agents are able to coordinate locally at 
each of the state games defined in this way, we can guaran­
tee that they will implement an optimal (sequential) policy 
[2]. Of course, in an MDP of sufficient horizon, agents will 
repeatedly encounter the same (or similar) states. For this 
reason, coordination at single-stage state games has an im­
portant application to multistage (especially «process ori­
ented") decision problems. 
3 Learning with Observable Actions 
Solutions to the coordination problem can be divided into 
three general classes, those based on communication, those 
based on convention and those based on learning. For ex­
ample, agents might communicate in order to detennine 
3We note that optimal equilibria need not be deterministic 
OJ As. E.g., if A had another action m that behaved similarly to 
r, then it could randomize between m and r; and if B adopted r, 
an optimal equilibrium would result However, we will continue 
to speak as if optimal equilibria are OJ As. 
4In other words, they can compute the value function of the 
Markov decision process [7, 14]. We refer to [2J for a discus­
sion of the details, benefits and computational implications of this 
assumption. 
task allocation [ 18, 17] or simply inform one another what 
actions they will choose. Conventions (or social laws) 
might be imposed by the system designer so that optimal 
joint action is assured [9, 16]-intuitively, a convention re­
stricts (or forces) consideration to a subset of feasible or op­
timal joint actions (such as the convention of driving on the 
right hand side of the street). Finally, coordinated action 
choice might be learned through repeated play of the game, 
either with the same agents (4, 8, 1 0] or a random selection 
of similar agents [1, 15, 11, 19]. 
We focus here on learning models in which agents repeat­
edly interact with the same set of players in state games. 
In this section, we assume that each agent can observe the 
actions of the others at each interaction. Intuitively, each 
agent uses its past history to form an estimate of strategies 
used by the other agents. At each interaction, or play of the 
game, an agent will choose a best response action to exe­
cute, given its predictions (or beliefs) about the behavior of 
the other agents. Once the game is played, the agent can 
observe the actual actions chosen by the other players and 
update its beliefs regarding future play accordingly. 
3.1 Fictitious Play 
One of the simplest learning models for repeated games 
is fictitious play [ 13]. Each agent i keeps a count ci,, 
. a 
j E o:, aJ E Aj, of the number of times agent j has 
used action ai in the past. When the game is encountered, 
i treats the relative frequencies of each of j's moves as in­
dicative of j's current (randomized) strategy. That is, for 
each agent j, i assumes j plays action ai E Aj with proba-
bility c�j I (Lbi EAj ctj). This set of strategies forms a re­
duced profile IT_;, for which agent i adopts a best response. 
After the play, i updates its counts appropriately, given the 
actions used by the other agents. 
This very simple adaptive strategy is not guaranteed to con­
verge to equilibrium in general, but will converge for two­
person zero-sum games [13]. More importantly, the meth­
ods of Young [19] can be applied to our simple coopera­
tive games to show that it is guaranteed to converge to a 
coordinated equilibrium (that is, the probability of coordi­
nated equilibrium after k interactions can be made arbitrar­
ily high by increasing k sufficiently). We simply require 
that an agent randomize between all pure best responses 
when more than one is available.5 It is also not hard to see 
that once the agents reach an equilibrium, they will remain 
there-each best response simply reinforces the beliefs of 
the other agents that the coordinated equilibrium remains 
in force. We do not discuss rates of convergence or experi­
ments, since the model is similar to the particular Bayesian 
methods we describe next. 
5 We also require that utilities be rational so that the opportunity 
to randomize arises (see below). 
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3.2 Bayesian Best-Response Model 
A popular method for learning to selec� equilibria assumes 
that agents have a prior beliefs, in the form of a probabil­
ity distribution, over the possible strategies of other agents, 
use Bayesian update this adjust their priors as experience 
dictates, and adopt a best response at each interaction based 
on their current beliefs [8, 4]. In repeated games, one could 
(and should) technically have priors over another agent's 
sequential strategy, including how it might react to one's 
current moves in the future (8]. However, the practical dif­
ficulties of specifying anything but the simplest priors is ev­
ident; this also runs contrary to the spirit of decomposing 
sequential problems into states games (Section 2.2). So we 
restrict attention to beliefs about single-stage strategies for 
the state game G. 
We assume each agent i has an prior distribution over the 
strategies that could be adopted by other agents. The be­
liefs of agent i about agent j are represented by a probability 
distribution over the set of (randomized) strategies �(Aj) 
agent j might adopt. We denote by Bel; (j, 1r j, s) the degree 
of belief agent i has that j will perform strategy 7rj. 
As a general rule, any reasonable prior could be used (pro­
vided it does not rule out the choice of some action in the 
state game). However, we will consider only the case where 
each agent uses a simple prior, the Dirichlet distribution. 
This can be represented with a small number of parameters 
and can be updated and used quite easily. Let n be the car­
dinality of j's action set. Agent i's beliefs about j are rep­
resented by the Dirichlet parameters Nr, ... N�, capturing 
a density function (see [6]) over such strategies. The ex-
pectation of kth action being adopted by j is Et , . In-N, 
tuitively, each Nk can be viewed as the number of times 
outcome k (in this case action k) has been observed. The 
initial parameters adopted by agent i represent its prior be­
liefs about agent j's strategy. For simplicity, we assume that 
prior parameters are set uniformly (e.g., at 1), reflecting a 
uniform expectation for each of j's actions (this is not a uni­
form prior over strategies, of course). 
As in fictitious play, at each interaction agent i should adopt 
a best response based on its current beliefs. Instead of a 
strategy profile, agent i has a distribution over individual 
strategies and an induced distribution over profiles. How­
ever, the Dirichlet parameters permit the expectation of in­
dividual moves, and hence a best response, to be determined 
easily. When the interaction has ended, i updates its beliefs 
by incrementing the parameters Ni (where agent j was ob­
served to perform its kth action).6 
6lt is important to note that the agents are updating as if the 
sampled distribution were stationary, which it is not. Thus, con­
vergence must be ensured by properties of best responses. We 
also note that the conclusions we draw below regarding the per­
formance of Bayesian learning (versus fictitious play) are not in­
tended to denigrate the Bayesian method. The fact is we are using 
priors about "initial" strategies as if they were beliefs about the fi-
110 Boutilier 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
\ 
\-.. \\ 
\\ 
\ \ ' \ 
2<2 +-
3li:S, -+--· SxS ·D · ·  
1Qx10 -M-
Figure 2: Convergence of Pure Coordination Games of Var­
ious Sizes. All results averaged over 30 trials. 
In our example above (assuming observable actions), we 
might set the initial belief parameters of both agent A and B 
to ( 1, 1) (they each expect the other to go left or right with 
equal probability). Thus, they will each randomize between 
l and r uniformly. If the result of this randomization is coor­
dinated (e.g., joint action (l, l) ), both update their distribu­
tion to be (2, 1). At the next interaction, both will adopt l as 
a best response and reinforce the initial choice. It is easy to 
see that the OJA (l, l) is guaranteed to be selected forever. 
However, suppose the initial randomization results in the 
joint action ( l, r) . In this case, their updated beliefs will be 
different: A's parameters (1, 2} indicate B will again per­
form r, while B's (2, 1) indicate the opposite. There is no 
chance of coordination at the next interaction: the action 
will be (r, l) (each switches actions). Their updated param­
eters will each be (2, 2) at this point and randomization can 
again take place providing another chance to coordinate at 
the third interaction. 
It is not hard to see that, in this example, the agents have 
the opportunity to randomize at every second interaction, 
and the chance of coordination at each such round is 0.5. 
The probability that the agents fail to converge by round 
k (i.e., 1j2L �J) therefore decreases exponentially with k. 
To illustrate, Figure 2 shows experimental results for this 
2 x 2 games, as well as larger n x n pure coordination 
games.7 The x-axis shows the number of times the game 
has been encountered, while the y-axis shows the average 
error probability-the chance an uncoordinated joint action 
is adopted using the agents's best response strategies at that 
point. In such pure coordination games, it is quite easy to 
nal "coordinated" strategies. It is remarkable that this misuse of 
Bayesian methodology works at all. 
7In each game there are n agents with n actions. The set of 
moves is the same for all agents and they are rewarded with value 
c if they each execute the same move, and are given a smaller value 
d if they do not. Hence. there are n OJ As. 
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Figure 3: Convergence of 2 x 2 Asymmetric Games. Each 
game has a reward of 1 for one uncoordinated joint action, 
zero for the other, and the reward indicated ( 1, 4, 10, 20) for 
coordinated actions. All results averaged over 1000 trials. 
see that convergence to an optimal joint action will be quite 
rapid. For instance, in the 10 x 10 game coordination is all 
but assured by the fourth play of the game.8 
The rate of convergence can be adversely affected if the 
game is not symmetric. For example, consider the asym­
metric 2 x 2 game given by: 
l(B) r(B) 
l(A) 4 I 
r(A) 0 4 
Should the agents start with prior parameters (1, 1) repre­
senting their beliefs about the other's moves, then A's initial 
best response is l, while B's is r. The agents will not have 
the chance to coordinate their actions until they can ran­
domize among their pure best responses-when A assesses 
the probability of r (for B) to be � (or B assigns probabil-
ity � to l). Given the integer nature of the updates, this can 
only happen at the sixth interaction, and every seventh inter­
action after that. Thus, the rate of convergence (while still 
exponential) is slowed linearly by a factor of seven. To il­
lustrate the nature of these "plateaus", see Figure 3: values 
other than 4 (in the matrix above) are shown, along with the 
original 2 x 2 symmetric game. 
Proposition 1 Let G be a 2 x 2 coordination game, with 
a denoting the utility of coordinated action, and b, c denot­
ing the utility of the two uncoordinated actions. Assuming 
uniformDirichletpriorparameters {1, 1), the probability of 
failing to reach convergence at round k is 1/ ( 2l � J ) , where 
g = gcd((a- c), (a- c)+ (a- d)). 
8In fact, for larger values of n, faster convergence is due to the 
likelihood that the each randomization is more likely to produce a 
unique "most likely" (or majority) coordinated action. 
Thus convergence is slowed linearly by the factor g. This 
can be extended to non integer utilities in the obvious way; 
as long as the utilities are rational, convergence is guaran­
teed. We also note that nonuniform priors have little effect 
here, and that more heavily weighted priors do not preclude 
convergence, but can force a certain minimum number of 
encounters before coordination is possible. 
4 Learning with Unobservable Stochastic 
Actions 
The key difficulty with the models described above is the 
assumption that actions can be observed. As described at 
the outset, agents will typically be able to observe only the 
outcomes of these actions, and not the actions themselves. 
However, since the agents all know the game structure, the 
observations they make still provide evidence regarding the 
choices made by other agents. One simply needs to account 
for the inherent uncertainty in this information. 
It is worth noting that, in general, there must be a sufficient 
number of observable states that can be used to distinguish 
(probabilistically) which joint actions have been executed 
for useful learning to take place. For instance, suppose we 
have simple matrix game where agents move to a good state 
or a bad state. If they can't observe the action chosen by oth­
ers when moving to a bad state, then they can't tell which 
of the uncoordinated moves other agents did (i.e., very little 
information is available from which to learn). Our perspec­
tive is not so much that agents have a choice of actions that, 
correctly chosen, take them to a (single) good state (which 
is one interpretation of strategic form); rather they have a 
choice of possible good states, and their actions must be co­
ordinated in the sense of agreeing on the state they "aim" 
for. (These are, of course, extreme points on a spectrum.) 
4.1 Bayesian Best-Response Adapted 
The Bayesian best-response model we described above can 
be adapted to the case of unobservable stochastic actions 
in a rather straightforward way. As before, we assume 
agents use Dirichlet distributions over the strategies of oth­
ers to represent their beliefs. While belief parameters can­
not be updated directly with observation of a particular ac­
tion, agent i can update its beliefs about j's strategy by a 
simple application of Bayes rule. Agent i first computes the 
probability that j performed a for any ai E Aj, given the 
observed states and its previous action ai: 
Pr(a[j] = aiia[i] = ai,t) = 
Pr(tia[j] = aJ, a[i] = ai)Pr(a[j] = ai) 
Pr(tia[i] = ai) 
Here a[j] denotes j's component of a joint action a. The 
prior probabilities are computed using agent i's beliefs 
Bel; ( k, ak, s) for arbitrary agents k and the joint transition 
probabilities. Agent i then updates its distribution over j's 
Learning Conventions 111  
O.S r---.,.:C:::•"::.::••�'9•::n•::.• .::,•' ::."'oc:::h:::as:::Hc.::2x2:_G�a::.::mo::.:_wrt::.h_:_:V• :..:.'>'':,;:"9:;_•• ::::ilu::.:_'•_:_:P'.:.:_•b•::.----, 
O.S 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
\" 
"\; -� \ .
� {;J_ \ bE:I, 
\ tJ� 
D"l __ o.os 
0.2 
20 30 40 
Nuntler ol Inte-ractions 
Failure Prob 0.20 .....,._ 
Failon•Prob0.10 -+--· Fail�r• Prob 0.05 -c­
Failur• Prob 0.01 • 
Figure 4: Convergence of 2 x 2 Stochastic, Unobserv­
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over 1000 trials. 
strategies using this "stochastic observation;" in particu­
lar Ni is incremented by Pr( a{ it) (intuitively, by a "frac­
tional" outcome).9 
In the stochastic version of our example, let A and B adopt 
the initial parameters ( 1, 1). If the initial randomization re­
sults in coordinated joint action (e.g. (l, l) ), and the prob­
able outcome s1 results, coordination is assured forever. 
However, suppose the first joint action is (l, r) and it has 
its most likely outcome s4. Then A's belief parameters be­
come (1.1, 1.9) and B's (1.9, 1.1). The best response at 
the next interaction is (r, l), resulting in updated parame­
ters {1.938, 2.061) for A and (2.061, 1.938) forB (assum­
ing the expected outcome). Unlike the deterministic case, 
the agents will not be able to randomize or coordinate. In 
fact, given any sequence of "most likely outcomes," it is not 
hard to see that A and B will never coordinate, unless they 
do initially. Fortunately, this cycle of suboptimal joint ac­
tions can be broken by an unlikely outcome (i.e., if one of 
the actions "fails"). Experimental results for different fail­
ure probabilities in this 2 x 2 scenario are shown in Figure 4. 
These results illustrate the rather "paradoxical" fact that the 
less error prone (or more predictable) the available actions 
are, the slower the agents are to converge. Indeed, one can 
see that the stochastic actions play the role of "experimen­
tation" for these agents, a technique used in game theory for 
agents to break out of suboptimal best response cycles.10 
One way to enhance convergence is to have agents random-
9These fractional parameters correspond to the expectations of 
a weighted combination of integer-parameter Dirichlet distribu­
tions that result from standard update using the positive probabil­
ity outcomes. 
10 Detailed, but straightforward, analysis of convergence using a 
Markov chain model is provided in a forthcoming technical report. 
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Figure 5: Convergence of 2 x 2 Stochastic, Unobservable 
Action Games With .:-Best Response. Various values of.: 
(0.00, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0. 15)are shown. Action failure prob­
ability is 0.05. All results averaged over 1000 trials. 
ize over .:-best responses [8]. This allows agents to ran­
domize among actions that are close to being best responses 
given their current beliefs. In the example above, the beliefs 
of the agents "hover" around the point at which they will 
randomize-allowing .:-best responses gives the agents am­
ple opportunity to break out of such cycles. This results in 
slightly better convergence in this example (see Figure 5). 
4.2 Fictitious Play Adapted 
Finally, we note that fictitious play can be adapted to the 
setting of unobservable stochastic actions with good suc­
cess. Unlike the Bayesian model, we cannot rely on priors 
to estimate the probability a given action was performed. 
Instead we use likelihood estimates as a means of updat­
ing frequency counts in a way that accounts for the stochas­
tic aspect of observations. When an outcome state s is ob­
served, each agent i determines Pr" ( s) for each joint action 
a (this is just part of the agent's model). The relative likeli­
hood of a is Pra ( s) J Lb Prb ( s), where a and bare restricted 
to range over joint actions such that a[i] = ai, b[i] = a' 
(i.e., i uses the knowledge of its own selected action ai). Us­
ing these likelihoods, i computes the likelihood that j per­
formed individual action ai to be 
l:{Pra(s) : a[j] = aJ} 
2: Pra(s) 
(again, a[i] = a; is assumed). The likelihood estimates for 
each of these individual actions are used to update agent i's 
frequency counts. 
In our example, frequency parameters are updated by 0.9 
or 0.1 for every possible outcome. This allows agents to 
randomize much more frequently, and is comparable to the 
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Figure 6: Convergence of 2 x 2 Games using Bayesian 
Learning, Stochastic Fictitious Play, and Fictitious Play 
with Conventions. Action failure probability is 0.05. All 
results averaged over I 000 trials. 
action observable setting (for this example, not in general). 
Convergence for this version of fictitious play is compared 
to the Bayesian learning model for the 2 x 2 game (Figure 6), 
and a more complicated 3 x 3 game (Figure 7). 
5 Conventions 
Finally, we consider how true conventions might arise via 
learning. The problem with all of the models above, in the 
presence of stochastic actions, is that they cannot be said to 
converge to a true convention in the sense discussed in the 
introduction. By a conventional way of acting, we mean a 
fixed strategy that is applied to a given situation without re­
quiring any special deliberation. The learning models de­
scribed all have a chance of "popping out" of equilibrium 
(e.g., through a series of unlikely occurrences) though the 
probability of this generally decreases quickly over time. A 
more serious difficulty is that the agents must constantly up­
date their beliefs and "reconsider" their choice of action (by 
recomputing possible best responses). This is certainly not 
in the spirit of conventions, or fixed rules of encounter, that 
one must simply apply to a given situation. 
Intuitively, we would like agents to adopt some criterion 
that would allow them to identify that an optimal equilib­
rium has been reached, and that this realization is common 
knowledge. In this way, agents will eventually stop "think­
ing" about how to behave in a given state and simply act.11 
It is important to emphasize the role common knowledge 
11 Adopting a convention in this sense does not mean that agents 
cannot adapt to changes in circumstance (e.g., the introduction of 
new agents). This would be reflected by the fact that the agents 
engage each other in a different state, for which the adopted con­
vention does not apply. 
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Figure 7: Convergence of 3 x 3 Games using Bayesian 
Learning, Stochastic Fictitious Play, and Fictitious Play 
with Conventions. Action fai lure probability is 0.05. All 
results averaged over 1000 trials. 
plays here. If an agents use personal knowledge in the de­
cision to jump to a conventional equilibrium (e.g., assess­
ing the probability of a joint action using knowledge of its 
own action, or its personal prior), they risk adopting differ­
ent conventions (and never reconsidering), perhaps guaran­
teeing suboptimal behavior from that point on. 
We propose a model based on our stochastic extension of 
fictitious play and have agents compute the likelihood esti­
mate of all OJ As (the "target" equilibria) given their current 
observation. If any OJA a has a higher l ikelihood estimate 
than b, b is "removed" from subsequent consideration. For 
instance, consider our 2 x 2 game. Suppose the agents end 
up i n  the state (ll); regardless of past behavior and what ac­
tual actions the agents performed, there is a unique OJA, 
(l , l), that has maximum likelihood. We notice that each 
agent can determine this i ndependent of any personal infor­
mation, and is aware that others have this ability as well­
the OJ As with maximum likelihood are common knowledge. 
From this point on, the agents will perform (l, l), even if 
the initial action they performed was (r, r}, and by chance 
it had this very unlikely outcome. 
In a similar 3 x 3 game, once could imagine that moving 
to a certain state is most l ikely given two of the three OJ As 
(e.g., (1 ,  1, 1) and (2, 2, 2)), but is less likely given the third 
(e.g., (3 , 3 ,  3) ). When this state is observed, the agents will 
reject (3 ,  3, 3) as a potential equilibrium, will individually 
never consider performing action 3, and will never consider 
a joint action in which the other agents performed 3 to have 
positive probability at any future interaction: the rows in 
the matrix corresponding to the components of the rejected 
OJA will be effectively "deleted." 
. 
Formally, conventions are added to a learning model (such 
as fictitious play) as follows. At each interaction (say inter-
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action k ), each agent computes a likelihood estimate LE( a) 
for each OJA a, given the observed outcome (we note that 
in fictitious play, these are computed for all joint actions, 
and will therefore be avail able anyway). The set MLE( k) is  
the set of OJ As that have maximum l ikelihood. The game is 
then altered as follows: any action ai E Ai that does not oc­
cur i n  any element of MLE( k) is "deleted" from the game i n  
the sense defined above. At interaction k + 1, coordination 
is attempted for this reduced game. If we are fortunate, the 
MLE set will eventually be pared down to a singleton (or a 
set of OJ As with "interchangeable" components) and a con­
vention will be reached that can never be dropped. This will 
not always be the case, of course, as we discuss below. 
Conventions based on maximum l i kelihood estimates can 
be implemented "as is", with each agent randomly choos­
ing actions and ruling out certain possibilities as warranted 
by MLE. However, this is unlikely to work well in scenarios 
with a sufficiently large number of outcomes, so that many 
states have zero probability of being reached by any OJA 
(e.g., imagine a 10 x 10 game where only a small fraction 
of the 101 actions have positive probability of an "informa­
tive" outcome). In this case, the rate of convergence will be 
dictated by the probability of reaching an informative state 
given a random joint action (which can be tiny i n  a case 
like this). We actually want to use l earning to bias agent re­
sponses i n  order to increase the probability of an OJA (or 
simply the chance of informative outcomes). 
This is easily accompl ished by grafting conventions onto 
the learning models described above, having agents main­
tain personal estimates of other agents's strategies and 
adopt best responses. Thus convergence to OJAs will oc­
cur even if MLE does not prune actions. In an extended fic­
titious play model, this is straightforward. The only com­
plication lies i n  the deletion of i ndividual actions from the 
game: each agent i must be sure that, in future updating and 
computation of best responses, the estimated frequencies of 
the actions deleted for agent j are ignored. The relative fre­
quencies of the remaining actions form the basis of best­
response considerations at subsequent interactions. 
Convergence for fictitious play with conventions is com­
pared to straightforward fictitious play for our standard 2 x 2 
game i n  Figure 6, and a more complicated 3 x 3 game in 
Figure 7. In both cases convergence is enhanced, remark­
ably so in the 3 x 3 case, where coordination is guaran­
teed after one interaction. Of course, this is an artifact of 
the game-each outcome state has a unique OJA with max­
imum likelihood.12  While convergence is enhanced, we 
note that a more important function of conventions i s  their 
role in the eventual elimination of the computational burden 
associated with ongoing computation of best responses. 
12Informally, this game has six outcome states, three "good" 
and three "bad". Each good state corresponds to an OJA in the 
sense that the OJ A likely leads to that state. If only two of the three 
individual actions are the same, there is a small chance of moving 
to the good state corresponding to the majority action, and so on. 
The game was actually designed to prevent ordinary fictitious play 
from converging too quickly ! 
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We note that conventions will not generally lead to a unique 
choice of OJA. For example, in a game with three OJAs, 
where two of them lead to the same outcomes with the same 
probabilities, nothing can distinguish the two from the point 
of view of likelihood. In other words, each action outcome 
accords the same likelihood to these two actions. In this 
case, the learning component will choose one of the two ac­
tions; but while conventional deliberations may rule out the 
third, they must leave open the possibility that either of the 
remaining two actions could be performed. In such a case, 
conventions cannot be used to prevent agents from contin­
uing to update their beliefs.13 However, in a case l ike this 
conventions still play a role in restricting attention in learn­
ing to particular possibilities, even if they cannot choose a 
unique equilibrium. The analysis of conventions and their 
effect on convergence is the subject of ongoing investiga­
tion and experimentation. 
6 Concluding Remarks 
We have studied several learning models from game the­
ory, and their extension to coordination problems with un­
observable actions. As we have seen, a number of differ­
ent problem features, such asymmetries in utility and failure 
probabilities can have surprising effects of convergence to 
a coordinated equilibrium. We have also proposed the use 
of conventions as a means to restrict attention to particular 
equilibria, in some cases allowing eventual relief from hav­
ing to "think about" what action to perform. 
The experimental results are not conclusive; rather they 
are merely suggestive of interesting models for coordina­
tion learning, models that require further exploration. How­
ever, some of these directions appear promising. In ad­
dition, the interaction of these methods in true sequential 
decision problems consisting of a wide variety of related 
state games is of considerable interest [2]. In this setting, 
we are ultimately interested in the generalization of learned 
conventions across similar state games, exploiting struc­
tured (Bayes net) representations of games and utility func­
tions, as in [3] . Finally, generalizations of this model, espe­
cially those where only partial common knowledge of the 
game structure is assumed, will be required to make the ef­
fort more robust and realistic. This will require the use of 
ideas from reinforcement learning and learning models of 
dynamical systems. 
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13In principle, one can detect this fact by analyzing the legal ac­
tions remaining at any point in the game and seeing if they can be 
distinguished by likelihood estimates. If the agents ever reach the 
point where (say, in this example) the two actions can never be dis­
tinguished, they can cease computing likelihood estimates, since 
the impossibility of reaching a convention has been detected. 
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